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The Coalition of the Unwilling: Contentious Politics, Political Opportunity Structures, and Challenges for the Contemporary Peace Movement

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Abstract

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Victoria Carty

Abstract

The Bush Doctrine, which was installed after the 9-11 attacks on the United States under the guise of the war on terrorism, postulated a vision of the United States as the world's unchallenged superpower and the invasion of Iraq became one of the central fronts of this war. After failing to get approval by the United Nations for the invasion, the Bush Administration's attempt to assemble a coalition of the willing became critical to the battle for public opinion to back the war. While the administration was able to garner some support, the coalition eventually unravelled and all troops are expected to depart by 2011 in what is perceived by many as a failure of U.S. foreign policy. This article discusses how different strands of social movement theory, including resource mobilization and the political process model, can be combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war. It contributes to the literature on social movements by assessing the ways in which structural- and micro-level mobilization efforts are often interconnected in order to explain both the how and the why of social movements, usually treated separately in much of the extant research.

The National Security Strategy document, or the "Bush Doctrine," which was installed after the 9-11 attacks on the United States postulated a vision of the United States

as the world's unchallenged superpower. It defended the preemptive use of U.S. military power, refusal of the United States to be bound by any international treaty or organization, the ability to violate international laws and disregard international institutions such as the United Nations (UN) when expedient to do so, and explicitly linked U.S. economic and military policy (Peter 2007). Critics charge that it served to accelerate the process of imperial globalization in the name of providing security to U.S. citizens and its allies under the guise of the "war on terrorism" (Gitlin 2005). The war on terrorism, as spelled out by the Bush administration, is defined as the military, political, and legal actions in response to 9-11 with the objective of countering terrorist threats, preventing terrorist acts, and curbing the influence of terrorist organizations (whitehouse.gov).

Former President Bush consistently referred to the 2003 invasion of Iraq as one of the central fronts in the war on terrorism (Peter 2007). After failing to get approval by the United Nations (UN) for the invasion, the administration's attempt to assemble a "coalition of the willing" became critical to the battle for public opinion to back the war. Shortly before the Iraq war began the U.S. government announced that nearly forty countries had joined the coalition. However, only four contributed troops—Britain, Poland, Australia and Denmark, and more than 95% of the committed combat troops were American or British (Ripley 2008).

Key countries on the UN Security Council, most notably France and Russia, did not support the coalition from the onset, and as the conflict dragged on politicians and citizens in countries that originally supported the invasion began to question the war and dropped out of the coalition. As global networks of individuals pressured their

governments to cooperate in a coalition of the *unwilling*, the coalition eventually unravelled and all combat troops are scheduled to leave Iraq by 2011 in what is perceived by many as a defeat for the United States (Farrell 2008). Consequently, this raises questions regarding the ability of the United States to operate unilaterally in the future, and what factors were responsible for the demise of the coalition. In the past the United States' success as sole superpower depended on a system of alliances with other powers and a division among those who would challenge it (Owens 2006). However, this has been altered on two fronts. First, at the core of the Bush Doctrine is the replacement of international cooperation with a world order based on direct U.S. assertion that it will act alone if necessary. Second, there emerged a collective opposition to the U.S. invasion even among former allies as public opinion increasingly turned against participation in the war on terrorism.

This article discusses how different aspects of social movement theory can be combined to examine how the coalition of the unwilling emerged and what effect it had on the failure of the United States to sustain support for the Iraq war. Resource mobilization and framing theories can explain how the contemporary peace movement forged a sense of transnational collective identity as groups organized to utilize resources and attempted to influence public authorities through contentious politics. Other theories that employ the political process model, and the focus on political opportunity structures (POS) in particular, illustrate that the collapse of the coalition was also due in part to a "revolution at the ballot box." The political process framework draws attention to the importance of working within the formal arena of institutional and electoral politics. Its emphasis on potential shifts in governance discourse, which allow activists to question

states' legitimacy and manipulate competition between political elites, helps to clarify *why* mobilizations emerge. Incorporating both resource mobilization and political process theories further illuminates how activists and politicians took advantage of the process of blowback—the unintended consequences that resulted in their countries due to their governments' support of the U.S. mission. I argue that neither resource mobilization nor structural theories on their own can sufficiently explain the demise of the coalition and ultimate defeat of the United States' efforts in Iraq. This analysis contributes to the literature on social movements, much of which relies on a particular theory that focuses exclusively on either the *how* or the *why* of social movements, by assessing the complex ways in which structural- and micro-level mobilization efforts are interconnected.

Social Movement Theory

One central component of social movement theory is resource mobilization. This branch examines the tactical and strategic repertoires that activists use in specific campaigns as well as organizational dynamics, leadership, resource management, and the construction and legitimation of collective identities (Tilly 2001; McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996). Collective identity refers to the association of the goals and values of a movement with one's own, and these can be a perception of a shared status or relationship rather than an exclusively concrete one (Polleta and Jasper 2001). Key to forging collective identity is how organizers “frame” their issues to resonate with potential recruits and they do this by linking participants' grievances to mainstream beliefs and values (Snow and Benford 1992). Framing thus helps explain the articulation

of grievances, the dynamics of recruitment and mobilization, and the maintenance of solidarity and collective identity. Frames are influential when organizers persuade large numbers of people that the issues they care about are urgent, that alternatives are possible, that there is a worthiness (or moral standing) of the activists' demands, and that the constituencies they seek to mobilize can be invested with agency (Tarrow and Tilly 2006; Cress and Snow 2000). For a frame to go from understanding to motivating action it must have the elements of injustice, identity, and agency (Gamson 1992).

Keck and Sikkink's (1998) work describes types of global mobilizing strategies as Transnational Activist Networks (TANs). TANs emerge when social movement actors form alliances and coalitions with activists outside of their state to put pressure on their governments when they are unresponsive to their demands. These have been effective in the global solidarity network for the Zapatista struggle in Mexico (see Olsen 2006); indigenous struggles against the Guatemalan government for its involvement in the slaughter of thousands Guatemala citizens during the civil war of the 1980s (see Stewart 2006); and in the labor organizing efforts in the maquila industry in Mexico (see Carty 2006).

Such networks demonstrate how movements with transnational ties can help cultivate movement identities, shape new activist frames, transcend nationally defined interests, and build solidarity with a global emphasis. Though these networks are flexible and are made up of various coalitions that often work on different issues, the main bond between them is that they maintain similar values and visions. One of the primary goals of TANs is to create, strengthen, implement, and monitor international norms (Khagram and Sikkink 2002). These international norms are sometimes part of the resources social

movement actors use to draw in new recruits and to develop their collective beliefs, as appealing to pre-existing international norms helps to legitimate local grievances.

Another goal of TANs is to transform their collective beliefs into new international norms by using persuasion and moral pressure to change institutions and governments (Khagram and Sikkink 2002).

One of the most common repertoires for the peace movement has been utilizing local and international networking in the form of street protests and rallies. Though single protests rarely have direct or immediate results, they are effective in a number of other ways. For example, they serve the function of dramatizing the legitimacy, unity, numbers, and commitment of groups supporting the social movement goals (Tilly 2004; McAdam et al. 2001). They also help to consolidate activist identities among new recruits and long-term members by dramatizing conflict and creating “us-versus-them” identities as they develop an oppositional consciousness (McAdam 1996).

While resource mobilization can explain the *how* of social movements, Touraine (1985) notes some of the shortcomings due to the neglect of the *why*. Most notably he argues that this framework tends to overlook structural problems and define actors by their strategies and not by the social relationships, especially the power relationships in which these actors are involved. It also pays little attention to hegemonic forms of power and the multiplication of points of antagonism. Additionally, the ability of social movement activists to engage successfully in contentious politics relies to a large extent on political opportunity structures (POS). These are defined by Tarrow (2001) and Gamson and Meyer (1996) as institutional initiatives in the form of a shift in governance configurations toward more openness or closure of institutions and policy arenas, and/or

a shift in governance culture or discourses. In other words, they refer to the perception of what are legitimate forms of social engagement in a certain political context at a certain point in time when institutional politics appear to be unresponsive to activists' concerns. Another major factor that can enhance the potency of collective action is a division among those that the challengers are opposed to because this allows them to manipulate the competition between political elites (Meyer and Staggenborg 1998; Jenkins and Perrow 1977).

Following up on this contention, Smith (2002) and Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest that states can become more vulnerable to activists when they are divided because it creates new spaces in which to question state agendas and create alliances with powerful actors outside the domestic political arena. Therefore, states can at times serve as movement allies on particular issues or promote their strategic interests by aligning themselves with movement opposition to other governments' policies. Though these may only be small steps in the larger struggle, as Keck and Sikkink's findings support, when activists effectively shape individual state decisions international campaigns have a better chance of changing international policy. These dynamics further underpin the work of Marks and McAdam (1996) who argue that while nation-states remain a focus, challengers face an emerging system of multi-level governance, whereby the relations among states become resources or obstacles to movement goals.

The Contemporary Peace Movement and Contentious Politics

The war on terrorism has sparked a re-emergence of the peace movement on an international scale. Clearly, this movement is incredibly diverse and ranges from groups

that are strictly anti-war (United for Peace and Justice, Win Without War, Vote Vets, Military Families Speak Out, Bring Them Home Now, Stop the War Coalition, and Peaceful Tomorrows) to others that advocate for a variety of social justice issues (ANSWER, Code Pink, Global Exchange, Global Justice Movement, and MoveOn). Each of these groups will be discussed in more detail below. The first major protests organized immediately after 9-11 were sponsored by ANSWER (Act Now to Stop War and End Racism) which is one of the largest U.S.-based transnational peace organizations, and were held in San Francisco and Washington D.C. (Simonson 2003). UFPJ's (United for Peace and Justice), another leading U.S.-based and transnational peace organization was established one year later in response to certain frustrations with ANSWER. While initially the two groups held joint protests and rallies, because of disputes over issues of framing and agenda the two had a very public split and currently hold separate events (for a full description of the discrepancies between the two organizations see Coy, Wohrle and Maney 2005). In terms of leadership, organizational dynamics, and utilization of resources this has been a hindrance to the peace movement within the United States, but international momentum and activism in other countries has helped to sustain the overall mobilization.

Globally, between January 3rd and April 12th of 2003 thirty-six million people across the globe took part in almost 3,000 protests against the war in Iraq (Callincos 2005). The power of protest mobilization was most clearly evident on February 15, 2003, when the world experienced the largest international mobilization for peace ever. This was coordinated simultaneously in seventy-five countries with estimates ranging as high as fifteen million people across all six continents (bbc.com 2003). One of the

largest gatherings took place in London, where over two million people protested in Hyde Park alone (Bowley 2004). In Germany 500,000 protested, 300,000 rallied across France, and tens of thousands demonstrated in Melbourne; the largest peace march the city had witnessed since the Vietnam War (cnn.com). The international protest was one of a series of demonstrations organized by UK-based Stop the War coalition (the UK's largest antiwar organization which serves as an umbrella organization that networks with dozens of other peace, labor, Muslim and other groups) before and after the invasion of Iraq.

This international mobilization demonstrated the efficacy of global solidarity through grassroots protest as thousands of independent yet interconnected groups organized to challenge U.S. foreign policy as well as the role of their own governments in supporting the war. As resource mobilization theory suggests, through massive demonstrations activists dramatized the legitimacy of the cause and fostered a sense of solidarity and collective identity that served to enhance the commitment to a singular vision of impeding the invasion. In its aftermath, former assistant secretary general of the United Nations, Robert Muller stated, "Now there are two superpowers: the United States and the merging voice of the people of the world. All around the world, people are waging peace" (Hoge 2004). Also following the protest the *New York Times* described the global peace movement as "the world's second superpower," and it was immediately after this global demonstration that the governments of nine countries backed out of the coalition of the willing (*New York Times* 2003).

After the February 15th demonstrations other numerous events and coordinated actions took place to capitalize on the momentum of the protest. On the 16th of February

an estimated 400,000 protested in Milan and more than 300,000 took the streets in Barcelona in response to the governments' participation in the coalition of the willing (*New York Times* 2003). On that same day more than 6,000 candlelight vigils for peace were held in more than 100 countries (MoveOn.org 2003). Protests against state visits by President Bush also drew thousands to the streets globally. In November of 2003, 200,000 people protested in Trafalgar Square when President Bush made a state visit to the United Kingdom (*Agence French Press* 2004). When he visited Ireland in 2005, 50,000 citizens protested the use of Shannon Airport as a stopover point for U.S. troops bound for Iraq (*Organization Trends* 2005). When Bush left Shannon for Turkey and then later traveled to Canada he encountered similar scenes of hostility. Some of the most popular signs at protests that questioned the motive for the invasion and displayed resentment toward Bush included slogans such as, "Drop Bush Not Bombs," and "Regime Change Begins at Home" (*Agence French Press* 2004). Ultimately, the target of these protests was the Bush Doctrine and in particular the concept of preemptive war.

Many other activist organizations mobilized via the Internet as the numerous antiwar protests, speaking tours, vigils, and teach-ins were arranged primarily through cyberspace (Carty and Onyette 2006). Online activist groups such as Peaceful Tomorrows, Bring Them Home Now, Military Families Speak Out, and VoteVets are specifically comprised of military families, veterans, active duty personnel, and reservists and are organized mainly through wired networks. While traditional resource mobilization theories have analyzed mobilization efforts based on face-to-face contact, contemporary social movements such as the peace movement call for an expansion of these analyses to demonstrate how, through cyberactivism, individuals and coalitions can

foster a sense of collective identity and solidarity using new information communication technologies. Similar to traditional forms of collective action, what brings activists together in the virtual world is a shared sense of urgency, and though originally forged online these relationships often spill over into face-to-face interaction in the form of contentious politics (Carty 2009). In terms of framing, the online mission statements of each of these groups reflect a demand for justice in accordance with the principles of international law, opposition to the doctrine of unilateral military preemption, and promotion of U.S. foreign policy that places a high priority on internationally recognized principles of human rights, democracy, and self-rule. Similar to the rhetoric present at UFPJ-sponsored demonstrations of “Let the Inspections Work,” these groups view international institutions such as the UN as pertinent to securing peace (Coy, Woehrel and Manye 2005).

Win Without War (a coalition of dozens of national organizations opposed to the invasion of Iraq) and MoveOn.Org (which works on a number of progressive campaigns and one of the foremost issues of peace) are exclusively online organizations, and the two held one of the most prominent acts of online civil disobedience in the form of a virtual march to protest the imminent invasion of Iraq. Using email connections to coordinate and organize a protestor base, one month before the U.S. invasion 200,000 individuals signed up and made more than 400,000 phone calls and sent 100,000 faxes to every senate office in the United States with the message: DON’T ATTACK IRAQ! (withwithoutwar.org). It was also MoveOn that organized the thousands of vigils across the globe on the 16th of February before the March invasion. This again demonstrates how cyberactivism and contentious politics in the material world often spill over into

communities in material forms of action. The framing that both organizations employ also supports the policy of following international law and working in synch with global institutions. It further questions the notion of terrorism itself.

For example, prior to the invasion of Afghanistan MoveOn sent an online petition to congress stating, “If we retaliate by bombing Kabul and kill people oppressed by the Taliban, we become like the terrorists we oppose” (MoveOn.org). Once the invasion of Iraq was underway it organized a massive transnational email drive to enlist signatures for a citizens’ declaration which was delivered to the UN Security Council that read: “As a U.S.-led invasion of Iraq begins, we the undersigned citizens of many countries reaffirm our commitment to addressing international conflicts through the rule of law and the United Nations. We pledge to redouble our efforts to put an end to the Bush Administration’s doctrine of preemptive attack and the reckless use of military power” (MoveOn.org). This was also displayed in a full-page ad in the *New York Times*.

In sum, the framing used by UFPJ, Win Without War, MoveOn and other sectors of the peace movement in the forms of signs, slogans, petitions, mission statements, and advertisements in newspapers incorporate a sense of injustice, identity and agency. By framing their concerns in moral and ethical terms through forms of contentious politics these groups questioned the validity of the claims for the retaliation for the events of 9-11 and the invasion of Iraq, exposed the contradictions of government officials ignoring international norms, and subsequently challenged the framing of the issues by those promoting the war. They also problematized the notion of terrorism itself by equating retaliation against Afghanistan and Iraq as acts of terror. For these organizations international cooperation, global norms, and international institutions such as the UN

figure centrally in their vision of a preferred world order. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) suggest, one of the primary goals of TANs is to frame their concerns in a way that petitions for the strengthening, implementation, and monitoring of international norms, and certain segments of the peace movement clearly mobilized to achieve this. Through contentious politics they sought to influence public opinion and alter the discourse of the debate by questioning the notion of preemptive war under the rubric of the war on terrorism, and pressured governments to act on moral principles that adhere to international standards of justice.

Relatedly, activists were also able to tap into mainstream beliefs and values to gain support by appealing to the moral worthiness of their grievances, which as Snow and Benford (1992) argue is critical for social movements. Both within the United States and abroad, leading up to the conflict public opinion supported letting the inspections work and/or UN approval before the United States and its partners in the coalition invaded Iraq. For example, a poll conducted by the *New York Times* and CBS News showed that two out of three respondents in the United States wanted the government to wait for the UN inspections to end before it invaded, and only 31% supported using military force immediately (cbsnews.org). Internationally, in most countries, including those that were most closely aligned with the United States, over 70% of the public opposed U.S. military action against Iraq without UN approval (Pew Research Center 2003). With such strong international opposition to the war activists were able to appeal to third parties by tapping into these common sentiments.

On the other hand, TANs sometimes use framing to try to transform their collective beliefs into new international norms by using persuasion and moral pressure to

change, rather than appeal to, institutions, laws or governments, as noted by Khagram and Sikkink (2002). ANSWER and its member groups are more supportive of this approach. Some of the most popular slogans at its rallies and demonstrations are “No Blood for Oil,” “End all Occupations Now” and “Who’s the Biggest Terrorist in the World Today – Bush, Cheney and the CIA” (ANSWER.org). This framing indicates an attitude that opposes imperialism, highlights the link between militarism and capitalism, and similar to MoveOn’s petition question how governments framed the concept of terrorism. As opposed to other organizations in the struggle for peace, ANSWER perceives international law to be a codification of the dominant capitalist states with no popular democratic source, and it is viewed as a creation United States’ national interest in particular (ANSWER.org). Thus, through transnational mobilizing it seeks to establish a new world order that bypasses the present international institutions in the hopes of creating new ones that are more democratic.

This framing of linking militarism to capitalism and superpowers invading weaker nations for imperialist reasons can be traced back to Lenin in the early twentieth century. He argued that because capitalism must always acquire new markets, new sources of raw materials, and new outlets for investment ultimately results in market competition that pushes the world superpowers try to rearrange who owns and/or controls what in terms of goods, markets and geopolitical influence (1916). This ideology has been manifest throughout the history of U.S. foreign policy. For example, after WWI Woodrow Wilson stated, “Since trade ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on having the world as a market, the flag of this nation must follow him, and the doors of the nations which are closed against him must be battered down. Concessions obtained by

financiers must be safeguarded by ministers of state, even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process” (Williams 1972). Several decades later the “Clinton Doctrine” during the 1990s dictated that Washington had the right to use military force to defend vital interests such as “ensuring uninhibited access to key markets, energy supplies and strategic resources” (Klare 2004).

Summarizing the link between war and the pursuit of profit, social critic and journalist for the *New York Times*, Thomas Friedman (2005), elaborates

The hidden hand of the market will never work without the hidden fist. McDonalds cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas. The hidden first that keeps the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies to flourish is called the U.S. army, air force, navy and Marine Corp. (p.36).

Though the fist is no longer hidden, the framing used by ANSWER signifies the necessity of war for capitalism to sustain itself and particularly with its “no blood for oil” rhetoric. It views the war on terrorism as a justification for controlling markets and for U.S.-based corporations to profit in the name of securing U.S. citizens. This framing process differs from other segments of the peace movement that endorse more of a globalist perspective. Its Marxist orientation, focus on the United States as empire, and rejection of international institutions and international law as fair arbiters of justice set it apart from other actors. However, despite the friction between UFPI and ANSWER there is consensus among the various international factions of the peace movement that the United States is an occupying force that must leave Iraq and allow Iraqis to establish their own form of self-governance.

As numerous and large as they were, mobilization efforts in the form of contentious politics by themselves were insufficient in preventing the war against Iraq

and failed to deter several governments from joining the coalition of the willing. Despite demands for restraint through the vast global networks of activists, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq without UN approval, thus disregarding both international law and public opinion. In response to the global protests President Bush stated he would not base policy on the opinions of a “focus group” (Stevenson 2003). In addition, some of the most prominent nations that joined the United States—Britain, Spain, Italy and Australia—also went against the demands of the majority of their citizens. Thus, while resource mobilization theory is helpful in explaining how the mobilization emerged, the various tactics and strategies it used, and how a shared sense of collective identity was established, on its own it cannot adequately explain how the peace movement was ultimately able to affect state decisions regarding whether or not to join, and later remain in or drop out of the coalition. Therefore, social movement theories that focus on institutional politics such as the political process framework are a necessary accompaniment because they explore how activists can use leverage at the ballot box, manipulate divisions among elites, and take advantage of phenomena such as blowback to force their opponents to address their demands.

The Political Process Model, POS and the Revolution at the Ballot Box

Political process theory can help refine our understanding of *why* the mobilization was eventually successful by focusing on structural dynamics that include hegemonic forms of power and the various and sometimes interconnected points of antagonism as suggested by Touraine (1985). Also, as Tarrow (2001) contends, a shift in governance discourse can assist activists in their ability to alter the debate and consequently open up

spaces for them to make demands on their governments. This oftentimes occurs when there is a division of political elites either on an international or domestic scale, and this proved to be essential to the development of the coalition of the unwilling.

President Bush's inability to garner international support from key members of the Security Council and other powerful nations to form a credible coalition of the willing resulted in a conflict between political leaders; some significant allies initially and vocally declined and most others eventually rescinded after originally agreeing to participate. From the onset key Security Council members including France, Germany, China, and Russia all demanded that the UN inspectors be given more time to locate the alleged weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, the United States, Britain, and Spain claimed that the Iraqi government was not cooperating and that an immediate assault was therefore justified (cnn.com). While there was wide support for the U.S. attack on Afghanistan two years earlier, this was in large part due to the sympathy the United States enjoyed given the magnitude of the 9-11 attacks. However, the original outpouring of sympathy quickly faded as many close allies became alienated due to the indignation that the Bush Administration displayed toward nations that were questioning its foreign policy on the issue of Iraq. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld referred to France and Germany as the "old" Europe when they refused to participate in the coalition, and in retaliation for Germany's reluctance to support the invasion Bush threatened to withdraw U.S. military bases from the region. Both Germany and France were also threatened with the loss of U.S. contracts for defense-related goods and services (Aguera 2003). And Bush's statements regarding the United

Nations as “irrelevant” when it refused to authorize the war obviously led to a division between the Bush Administration and the leaders of other powerful nations.

Among the countries that did participate in the coalition, almost all went against the will of their citizens (Bowley 2004). Whether their decisions were based on genuine support for U.S. policies, on fear of possible retaliation following President Bush’s statement in a post 9-11 press conference that you are “either with us or with the terrorists,” or on individual state decisions to pursue their own military, economic, and/or political interests are critical questions to explore. For example, the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) compiled an analysis of the thirty-four nations that publicly supported the United States and found that most were recruited through coercion, bullying, and bribery (ips-de.org). It exposed that some countries were trying to get into NATO at the time (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) and of course were cognizant of the fact that the United States can veto nations vying for membership. Also, many new European countries that signed on were former Warsaw Pact nations which have historically viewed the United States as their key post Cold War international protector (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Georgia). And finally, some nations were receiving foreign aid from the United States and had to consider opportunities for trade and investment on the one hand, or the threat of sanctions on the other (Mexico, Turkey, Costa Rica, and the Philippines). The United States has a long history of retaliating against countries that vote against its interests. One of the most blatant examples was when Yemen, the sole Arab country on the Council, voted against the resolution authorizing the 1991 Gulf War. A U.S. diplomat

told the Yemeni ambassador, “that will be the most expensive ‘no’ vote you ever cast.”

Three days later the United States cut its entire aid budget to Yemen (Bennis 2003).

This coercion substantiates ANSWER’s perception of the UN as dominated by the United States and its argument that such international institutions do not always operate on the basis of neutrality. The IPS analysis further noted that although the United States has used bribes and threats to manipulate the UN in the past, the scale of the pressure was new because governments faced such massive opposition at home.

Therefore, the mobilization efforts by citizens in the countries that joined the coalition were variables that elected officials had to at least consider when deciding whether or not to participate. However, these were weighed against political and economic ramifications given their standing vis-à-vis the United States. This highlights the significance of Tourrain’s (1985) contention that activists cannot only be defined by their strategies, but also by the power relations in which they are involved. In many cases public opinion was secondary to governments’ decisions to align themselves with the world’s sole superpower. These dynamics also illustrate the various points of antagonism that social movements often face, especially when dealing with international issues and systems of multi-level governance, which, as suggested by Marks and McAdam (1996), allow for relations among states to become resources or obstacles to movement goals. Clearly, the position of those countries that abstained from supporting the United States for various reasons strengthened the efforts of the peace movement, while those that disregarded public opinion and participated in the invasion impeded the activists’ efforts.

Though dozens of countries decided to back Bush in the war on terrorism initially, many of these were eventually pressured to back out or experienced regime change of

their own. Some of the staunchest allies, Britain's Tony Blair, Italy's Duce Silvio Berlusconi, Spain's Jose Maria Anzar, Poland's Jaroslaw Kaczynski, and Australia's John Howard all suffered losses in elections following their decision to back the Bush Doctrine. As Smith (2002) argues, divisions among those that challengers are opposed to can enhance their ability to question states' legitimacy and to manipulate the competition between political elites. Thus, states or politicians can serve as movement allies on particular issues or promote their strategic interests by aligning themselves with movement opposition to other governments' policies. These dynamics played out in each of these countries as actors pursued electoral reform to empower politicians that supported their cause.

The revolution at the ballot box was fueled by a number of factors: the initial hesitancy among citizens in most countries to support the war, protests that helped to raise consciousness regarding the reasons for the war and violations of international law, a division among elites within and across countries, and the process of blowback. Protests in several countries where political leaders originally cooperated with Bush helped lead to their defeat as activists dramatized the conflict and demanded accountability. For example, on the first anniversary of the invasion one million people protested against Berlusconi's complicity with Bush and demanded the withdrawal Italian troops (Ross 2004). His challenger and now new Prime Minister, Romano Prodi, pledged to withdraw the troops in his first speech to the senate (Beeston 2005). In Poland Karzynski was replaced by Donald Rusk, who used his first speech to parliament to announce a withdrawal. In February of 2006 Blair was voted out of office for his determination to stand "shoulder to shoulder" with Bush, which put him at odds not only

with British public opinion but also with his own Labor Party (which voted against their own party), several members of his cabinet (who resigned over the Iraq issue), and members of British intelligence and the military (Kershaw 2007). Furthermore, Australian Prime Minister John Howard, one of the first coalition partners to send troops to Iraq, was the first Australian prime minister to be voted out of parliament since 1929 as his eleven year old government was swept from power (Fullilove 2007). The new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, had promised to withdraw combat troops from Iraq.

Using the ballot box to oust leaders that went against the demands of their citizens therefore served to ultimately shape state decisions and change the discourse about the war by questioning the legitimacy of the Bush Doctrine as it pertained to preemptive war. By manipulating the divisions among political leaders internationally and domestically, social movement actors created new alliances to oppose states' agenda and ultimately pressured them to pull out of the coalition. Thus, political process theory is useful in clarifying how, in addition to the mobilization of resistance and use of contentious politics, activist in the peace movement were able to affect change by also utilizing institutional politics.

Activists also took advantage of public anxieties regarding the possibility of future terrorist attacks in order to broaden the challenge to their governments' collaboration with the United States. They argued that the possibility of blowback for participating in the coalition was putting citizens at a greater risk. The most serious episodes occurred in Spain and the UK. Three days before the Spanish general elections in March of 2004 five Madrid commuter trains were bombed, killing 190 people and injuring 1,400 (Elliot 2007). Voters elected Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero who fulfilled

his campaign promise by swiftly removing Spain's troops from Iraq. As mentioned earlier, in March of 2003 preceding the invasion hundreds of thousands had protested in Barcelona against the government's support for the Bush Doctrine. Despite the claims by the Spanish government that the separatist Basque fraction was responsible, the official investigation by the Spanish judiciary determined the attacks were directed and carried out by an al-Qaeda-inspired terrorist cell (*The Times* 2007).

On July 7, 2005, fifty-two people were killed in London when bombs exploded on various public transportation systems, and there was another failed bombing attempt on July 21 (Cowell 2007). The London bombings also seem to have been conducted in retaliation for Blair's involvement in the coalition of the willing, as both were linked to Islamist terrorist cells funded and aided by al-Qaeda. The Secret Organization Group of al-Qaeda of Jihad Organizing in Europe claimed to be behind the July 7 events. In a statement posted on an Islamic website, the group said the attacks were "in revenge of the massacres that Britain is committing in Iraq and Afghanistan" (hindustantimes.com). In a press conference in 2007 Bush stated that the United States and United Kingdom "are fighting these terrorists with our military in Afghanistan and Iraq and beyond so we do not have to face them in the streets of our own countries" (whitehouse.gov). Yet, the bombings in London and Madrid allowed an opportunity for the peace movement to shift the debate by arguing that citizens were increasingly vulnerable to attacks precisely *because* they were attempting to fight al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Iraq. By framing grievances in this way, peace activists once again questioned the very notion of terrorism and challenged leaders' own use of framing in their attempt to gain public support for contributing to the U.S. invasion.

Consciousness-raising was another tactic that segments of the mobilization against the war used to highlight the connection between the al-Qaeda attacks and the alliances between their leaders and the United States. For example, following the bombings Stop the War Coalition proclaimed, “Every day British troops stay in Iraq the more, in the eyes of millions of people across the world, the people of this country are taken to be implicated in a murderous occupation. By associating this country with the U.S. puppet regime in Iraq, Blair increases the threat to everyone who lives there” (swp.org). This boomerang effect created openings for activists to align themselves with domestic politicians who sided with the movement and questioned the current administrations’ position regarding the war on terrorism. It also served to solidify divisions among politicians which translated into resources for social movement actors to secure their goals as suggested by political process theories.

Finally, groups and individuals were able to take advantage of pragmatic failures as the war dragged on and dissatisfaction among the general public increased. The lack of an achievable goal or exit strategy, the exposure of the erroneous reports of weapons of mass destruction, the infamous “Downing Street Memo” that disclosed that a U.S. invasion of Iraq was inevitable and that the facts and intelligence were being “fixed around the policy” to invade Iraq by the Bush administration all helped to strengthen opposition to the war (Fielding 2005). Additionally, scandals of torture in violation of international standards at the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay prisons, and the recent indictment of Blackwater Corporation for the fatal shooting of Iraqi citizens further damaged the image of the United States both domestically and abroad. These incidents helped to once again shift the discourse and framing from one based on the United States

attempting to defend its citizens to one that focused on lies, deception, mishandling of the war, and disregard for the rules established under the Geneva Convention. These all helped to bolster the movement's ability to tap into and increase public opinion against the war and question U.S. foreign policy.

The Future of the Peace Movement

ANSWER's framing of the invasion Iraq as a culmination of imperialism and the project of neoliberalism, as forged by the United States to remold the Iraq economy under the guise of the war on terrorism is sound. For instance, two months after the invasion Paul Bremmer (director of reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to Iraq), when asked if the United States was in Iraq as liberators or occupiers responded, "It is a difficult word, but, yes, we are here as occupiers" (Masri 2003). The link between the war and the underlying agenda of forcing Iraq to pursue a path toward neoliberalism was also clear in his orders that included: the full privatization of public enterprises, full ownership rights by foreign firms of Iraqi businesses, full repatriation of foreign profits, the opening of Iraq's banks to foreign control, national treatment for foreign companies, and the elimination of nearly all trade barriers (Ackerman 2008). Later, in November of 2008 Bush and Iraq's prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, signed a "Declaration of Principles" which stated that the United States would reject congressional legislation that restricted funding to establish any military installation or base for the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of U.S. armed forces in Iraq or to exercise U.S. control of the oil resources (Korb 2008). The connection between U.S. corporations profiting from oil revenues and the war also became increasing evident as no-bid

contracts written by oil corporations such as Exxon, Shell, Total, Chevron, and BP (all are U.S.-based except BP which is British) to renew the oil concessions they lost to the nationalization of the industry prevailed over offers from more than forty other countries (Van Auken 2008).

Although, as the Bush Doctrine dictates, the United States can flex its military muscle with or without domestic and international support, it is important to acknowledge the strategic interests of other major players in the international struggle for profit and political power. It is naïve to assume, as some factions of the peace movement such as ANSWER sometimes do, that focusing exclusively on the United States as empire activists can end illegitimate invasions and the economic/political interests that drive them. As Lenin argued, globalization creates a system whereby numerous countries vie for economic leverage over their adversaries, sometimes engaging in forms of alliances, and sometimes resisting such alliances for their own purposes and agendas. The war on terrorism and the Bush Doctrine are merely one of the latest examples of these geopolitical strategies. Support for the Iraq war among political elites, as previously noted, almost always ran contrary to the sentiments of their citizens and was in many cases based on economic and political reasons as the IPS study revealed. This did not occur only among weaker or smaller nations that are vulnerable to retaliation by the United States. For example, Blair's close alliance with the United States, though overwhelmingly unpopular with British citizens, was supported by dominant sections of Britain's ruling elite, and particularly the Conservative Party because they perceived that this allegiance would allow them to regain a share of Iraqi oil (Kershaw 2007).

On the other hand, although much of the discord over the war stemmed from moral or legal concerns among citizens, at the state level governments' criticisms were part and parcel of economic rivalries and the fear that Washington's use of militarism would arrange world policies and economics to its benefit. Although refusal among world leaders to contribute support for the invasion may have been influenced in part by their citizens' attitudes as expressed through contentious politics, strategic economic considerations undoubtedly also played a role. For example, both France and Russia had negotiated large oil contracts with Iraq when Saddam Hussein was still in power; these business arrangements were clearly jeopardized by the U.S. invasion. Also, historically and for tactical reasons France and Germany have tried to establish an alliance that would ensure autonomy against both the United States and Britain, their key European competitor (Shribman 2002). Russia perhaps had the most to lose from the U.S. invasion as its ability to earn billions of currency from its oil and gas sales would certainly be at risk if Washington was able to take over the oil reserves in the Caspian Sea region—home to two-thirds of the world oil reserves (de Rooij 2007).

Thus, political and economic arrangements between states, which can serve as harbingers or impediments to social movements' goals, are critical. Given the multiple and interwoven relations among countries, the use of framing that simplistically views the United States as empire is myopic. Rather than building a movement around the lowest common denominator—opposing U.S. foreign policy—the mobilization should pivot to offer an alternative response by realizing that imperialist ambitions are as diverse as the peace movement itself. An acknowledgement of this multi-imperialism is essential because the empire framing allows other countries to be misrepresented as a counter

power while what they are doing geopolitically is often much the same as the United States.

In addition to reframing the struggle through more cosmopolitan thinking and understanding, the movement could benefit by establishing more transborder coordination, and coordination that goes beyond merely synchronizing annual days of protest. Much of this re-energizing is taking place between peace organizations and the Global Justice Movement (GJM), which seeks alternatives to the present system of neoliberalism and the institutions which support it that are more democratic, transparent, and represent the will of the citizens. At global gatherings such as the World Social Forum (WSF) members of the GJM have begun to redirect their attention to issues of war and this eventually led to the development of the Global Antiwar Movement (GAWM). In fact, it was at the 2002 social forum in Europe that activists set February 15th as a global day of mobilization (Della Porta and Diania 2006). Subsequently, every year GAWM has served as the main coordinator of protests on each anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. ANSWER is one of the most committed members of the GAWM, and many of the national organizations that constitute ANSWER were originally groups in the GJM.

Groups working within the GAWM have engaged in consciousness-raising efforts to highlight the current disconnect between citizens' aspirations and the individuals, parties, and institutions that purportedly represent and defend them and their interests. Originally, in coordinated efforts they undertook campaigns against U.S. military interventions that they perceived to be safeguarding the business interests of the elites at the expense of local political and economic development (Della Porta and Mosca 2007).

In addition to sponsoring antiwar rallies and demonstrations, they organized protests outside of the offices of some of the largest U.S.-based corporate contractors in Iraq such as Bechtel, Halliburton, Black & Veatch, and Carlyle Group across the United States (Sanger 2005). More recently, however, they have expanded their vision and tactics to incorporate a broader perspective on the relationship between militarism and capitalism that does not focus exclusively on the United States. At the 2005 WSF the GAWM put together a declaration that supports efforts to stop the economic occupation of Iraq by *all* foreign corporations and international financial institutions, escalates the campaign against war profiteers on an international scale through boycotts and direct action, and calls for the passage of legislation that addresses the lack of effective oversight in the Iraq contracting process (focusweb.org). This marks the emergence of a more globalist peace movement that combines the best of the aspirations of the different segments of the mobilization; one that acknowledges the link between forms of imperialism and militarism and the need for sovereignty of all nations against the threat of preemptive war, and a call for global institutions that are more democratic and do not exclusively represent the interests of elites.

Perhaps the most comprehensive approach that goes beyond the U.S. as empire discourse has been the establishment of Occupation Watch, a project led by UFPJ, Code Pink (another prominent U.S.-based organization in the peace movement), and Global Exchange (a San Francisco-based NGO that works on many progressive issues). Among its goals are monitoring the role of *all* foreign companies in Iraq, advocating for Iraqis' right to control their own resources, acting as a watchdog over the military occupation and U.S.-appointed "governing council," working with Iraqi movements that resist the

occupation, supporting the creation of independent Iraqi civil society organizations, and monitoring the physical impact of the invasion (International Crisis Center). These concrete steps toward assisting Iraqis in their effort to regain self-determination, holding foreign companies operating there accountable, and keeping a critical eye on military, business, and governmental operations represent a promising start to a broader and more encompassing understanding of the intermingling between economic, political and military agendas and ways to resist them on multiple fronts.

Conclusion

The peace movement that emerged in the post 9-11 environment deserves credit for raising fundamental doubts in the public and political spheres over the efficacy and political wisdom of states' participation in the coalition of the willing and the concept of preemptive war as articulated in the Bush Doctrine. Resource mobilization theory can explain how social movement actors solidified a sense of solidarity and collective identity as they strove to influence public opinion and elected officials using contentious politics in a variety of ways. Through the framing process some activists identified, interpreted and attributed their grievances to international standards of justice as embodied by the UN to appeal to mainstream values. Other members of the mobilization highlighted the relationship between economic and political pursuits and militarism, and are skeptical of international law and institutions in their present form. These different framing schemas illustrate that the peace movement is by no means homogenous, although it shares a common goal of Iraqi sovereignty and rejection of unilateral action through preemptive war as executed under the Bush Administration.

More structural-oriented theories, such as the political process framework illustrate that the collapse of the coalition was also due in part to a revolution at the ballot box as leaders of key U.S. allies were replaced by politicians sympathetic to the demands of the peace movement. This was enhanced by a shift in political discourse as the motivations for, and handling of the war, were increasingly questioned which allowed activists to manipulate competing positions held by political elites domestically and internationally. However, to further empower and revitalize the peace movement activists must raise consciousness about how the political economy of war influences government decisions, and perhaps more so than public opinion. Since political representatives are often impervious to popular will, a key focal point of the movement should be to expose how the continual game of chess played among the major national powers informs state decisions and actions and how the corporate-dominated global economy often gives rise to war in the first place. They must simultaneously and systematically challenge the system of war and neoliberalism and offer alternatives such as sovereign global institutions that can bolster local forms of sovereignty.

Whether or not recently elected President Obama will veer from the principles of the Bush Doctrine will become evident in the following years. While campaigning he promised to pull troops out of Iraq and claimed that he is committed to pursuing diplomatic and political solutions ahead of military ones. In a debate with Senator Hillary Clinton during the primaries he stated: “I don’t want to just end the war but I want to end the mind-set that got us into war in the first place” (Ackerman 2008). Later, in his inaugural address he elaborated on this by saying, “Our power alone cannot protect us, nor does it entitle us to do as we please. Instead, our power grows through its prudent

use; our security emanates from the justness of our course, the force of our example, and the tempering qualities of humility and restraint” (*New York Times* 2009). While this hinted at a constructive diplomacy-oriented foreign policy, as president he has wavered in backing up these statements. Once in office, he pushed back the withdrawal timeframe to August 21, 2010, and while he has taken more than 90,000 troops out of Iraq and announced the end of the American combat mission in Iraq, 50,000 troops remain to train Iraqi forces (*CBS News* 2010). Additionally, Afghanistan has replaced Iraq as the main focus of American military efforts as more troops are sent to support the “surge.”

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